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Restricting the Supply of Japanese Automobiles:
Sovereign Compulsion or Sovereign Collusion?
by Mitsuo Matsushita* and
Lawrence Repetat
I. INTRODUCTION
0 n May 1, 1981, the government of Japan announced that it would
adopt measures to restrict the export of Japanese automobiles to the
United States over a three-year period.'
In a letter dated May 7, 1981, under the signature of its Ambassador
to the United States, the Japanese Government described in detail the
measures with which it would implement the restriction of exports and
requested "that the Department of Justice, as the authority chiefly re-
sponsible for administering the U.S. laws, support the views of the Gov-
ernment of Japan."'2 In a letter of the same date, the Attorney General of
the United States stated that "The Department of Justice is of the view
that implementation of such an export restraint by the Government of
Japan . . . would not give rise to violations of United States antitrust
laws.
For a government to explain its actions in relation to a dispute
brought before a foreign court is not without precedent.4 What makes the
automobile case unique is that the Japanese Government took the ex-
traordinary step of explaining its actions in terms painstakingly designed
for analysis under American law, even before a dispute had arisen.
* Professor of Law, Sophia University, Tokyo; Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School (1977-1978). Doctor of Jurisprudence, Tokyo University, 1968. M.A., Ph.D., Tulane
University, 1962; A.B., St. Paul's University, Tokyo, 1956.
t Associated with the Tokyo law firm of Adachi, Henderson, Miyatake & Fujita; J.D.,
1979, University of Washington.
I Japanese morning and evening newspapers carried accounts of the announcement
which was made at the residence of the prime minister. No less than four Cabinet ministers
and the External Trade Representative were present. The text of the official announcement
along with Japanese texts of the letters are reported in 9 KOKUSAI SHOJI HOMU 287 (No. 6,
1981) [All footnotes in Japanese are verified by author].
2 This letter is reproduced in Appendix B.
3 This letter is reproduced in Appendix C.
4 See infra, Appendix A; see infra, Section on Statements by Foreign Governments at
59.
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As indicated by this exchange of letters, the resolution of the auto-
mobile dispute was cast in terms sanitized by "antitrust preventive main-
tenance." The obvious reason for this extraordinary step was to ensure
that those Japanese automakers who would restrict sales in the U.S. mar-
ket in response to measures taken by the Japanese Government would
not subsequently be exposed to liability for resulting violations of U.S.
law.
Foreign governments are adopting various measures to protect local
organizations from the spectre of antitrust litigation in the United States.
The more aggressive have adopted legislation barring local enforcement
by blocking the extension of the American discovery system into their
territories and other measures.5 In this case, the Japanese Government,
with guidance from its American counterpart, has adopted what may be
termed a submissive attitude to the requirements of American antitrust.
Foreign governments whose citizens trade in the U.S. market have
learned that they may not implement commercial policy in disregard of
the principles of American antitrust law. Even if foreign governments are
assured that U.S. enforcement authorities will take no action, there is no
such assurance that private plaintiffs will also refrain.8 As a result, such
private plaintiffs have come to be regarded as fearsome creatures. The
array of weapons at the private plaintiff's disposal includes a highly de-
veloped system of discovery, aggressive judges endowed with the power to
order a broad range of actions, an ever-increasing horde of American at-
torneys eager to file lawsuits and willing to proceed on a contingent-fee
basis, and the devastating impact of an award three times the size of the
demonstrated injury. Moreover, private litigants are typically unmoved
by considerations such as the maintenance of sound relations with foreign
governments; they are impervious to the havoc they may cause by attack-
ing in American courts actions taken in foreign countries by organizations
which may have substantial influence in those countries and which ac-
tions may have been taken with either the implicit or explicit approval of
5 See, e.g., Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11 (England); Foreign Antitrust
Judgments Act (Restriction of Enforcement) Austl. Acts, 1979, no. 13 (Australia). See also
Gordon, Extraterritorial Application of United States Economic Laws: Britain Draws the
Line, 14 INT'L LAW. 151 (1980), and Rosen, The Protection of Trading Interests Act, 15
INT'L LAW. 213 (1981). The text of a French bill forbidding disclosure of "documents or
information of an economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical nature, which are
intended for use as proof in a foreign judicial or administrative proceeding" unless otherwise
provided by law or treaty is reproduced at id. 29-31 (French).
8 In the automobile case, the plaintiffs best able to satisfy antitrust requirements would
appear to be Japanese automobile dealers. Their supply of goods has been restrained by the
manufacturers' voluntary agreement to limit exports. For the majority standing rule in anti-
trust cases see In Re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 481 F.2d 122 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
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foreign government officials in what those officials view as administration
of public policy.
The American plaintiff has gained the power to attack actions taken
in foreign countries because American courts have developed a doctrine
of application of law on the basis of effects felt within their home territo-
ries, rather than predicated on the locus of the activities.7 Thus, even
though activities which take place in foreign countries may be scrutinized
by the watchful eye of foreign governments, they may also be subjected to
attack by American plaintiffs and examination by American courts.
In designing the measures to be taken to restrict automobile exports
to the United States, the Japanese administrative authorities stepped
outside their customary administrative routine and adopted a format
more clearly suited to fulfill the requirement of protecting the exporters
from subsequent U.S. litigation. This incident provides a stark example of
sovereign respect for the American plaintiff.
II. INCIDENTS LEADING TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF RESTRICTIONS
Footnote 13 illustrates the increasing share of imported vehicles, par-
ticularly vehicles of Japanese manufacture in the U.S. passenger car mar-
ket. In the face of this increase, accompanied by heavy unemployment
concentrated in the Northeastern United States and particularly heavily
concentrated in the automobile and related industries, voices were raised
in many quarters in the United States throughout 1980 demanding the
establishment of restrictions on import of Japanese automobiles into the
United States. Fear was rife that the domestic auto industry would be
destroyed in free competition with superior Japanese producers; if this
were the case, the ripple effect throughout the American economy would
be of incalculable dimensions. The society that had been formed with the
automobile as its symbol and most apparent tool of description could not
survive the loss of the industry which produced it.
As the organization with most direct concern, the United Automobile
Workers (UAW) fied a request for import relief under section 201 of the
Trade Act of 1974,8 on June 12, 1980. Less than two months later, on
August 4th, the Ford Motor Company filed a similar request.
The International Trade Commission (ITC) held public hearings in
October, 1980, and, on December 3, 1980, the Commission announced its
decision. By a vote of three to two, the ITC found that although the U.S.
automobile industry had suffered severe injury, foreign automobile im-
ports were not a substantial cause of this injury.9 As a result of this deci-
" See infra, note 27.
0 Trade Act of 1974, § 201, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2487 (1976).
9 Report to the President on Investigation T.A.-201-44 under Section 201 of the Trade
1982
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sion, the President of the United States was denied power under the
Trade Act of 1974 to take measures to restrict imports.1° The question
whether the President has power to negotiate an orderly marketing agree-
ment independent of that Act (and despite a finding by the ITC of no
injury due to imports) is unresolved.1
Undaunted by what was perceived by many as a failure on the part
of the ITC to make a reasonable assessment of the situation, movement
for special congressional action to establish import restrictions gained
momentum. Most notable attempts included the draft legislation, com-
monly known as the Danforth-Bentsen bill, which would have limited im-
ports of Japanese automobiles to a fixed number over a period of three
years (1.6 million per year), and a resolution to expressly empower the
President to enter negotiations with foreign governments to persuade
them to voluntarily limit their export of automobiles and trucks to the
United States.' 2 The latter was introduced to the Senate Finance Com-
mittee and narrowly defeated.
Fear of the growing protectionist movement in the United States (in
particular, the Danforth-Bentsen bill) along with damage to the Japanese
image in the United States (combined with active lobbying by the Reagan
administration) persuaded the Japanese Government to consider and
eventually adopt unilateral measures to restrict exports to the United
States. A series of Cabinet level meetings that were held in Washington,
D.C. and Tokyo in early 1981 were climaxed by Special Trade Represen-
tative Brock's visit to Japan at the end of April. Mr. Brock's visit
culminated in an announcement, on May 1st, of an agreement on the spe-
cific terms of the Japanese export restriction. This resolution was pro-
duced just three days before the commencement of Prime Minister
Suzuki's first visit to the United States and constituted a major foreign
policy victory for the Reagan administration. 3 By producing an accept-
Act of 1974, I.T.C. 1110 (1980) [verified by author]. See Birenbaum & Tellis, Auto Imports:
Choosing the Options, Nat'l L.J., Mar. 23, 1981, at 26, col. 1.
10 Trade Act, supra note 7 at §§ 2251-53.
1 But see, Consumer's Union of the United States v. Rogers, 352 F. Supp. 1319 (D.C.
1973) modified and aff'd. sub. nom. Consumer's Union of the United States v. Kissinger 506
F.2d 136 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied 421 U.S. 1004 (1975).
:2 H.J. RES. 598, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
3 The volume of exports to the United States during the one year period from April 1,
1981, through May 30, 1982, is to be 1,680,000 vehicles, with an adjustment to that base
figuure reflecting any increase in overall projected sales in the U.S. market applicable in the
second year (through March of 1983). In the third year market conditions will be examined
to determine the need for and magnitude of any further restrictions. The base number of
1,680,000 is a reduction of approximately 140,000 vehicles from the 1980 figure. Statistics
produced by the Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association (JAMA) will be used to mea-




able restriction, the administration procured "breathing space" for Amer-
ican industry and destroyed the growing protectionist movement by se-
curing the voluntary commitment of the Japanese Government to
produce the very relief which the protectionists sought (in somewhat di-
luted form). Miraculously, because the restrictive measures were adopted
solely by the Japanese Government without formal U.S. participation, the
administration was able to claim that its image as a champion of free
trade remained unblemished. Finally, the unilateral format of the restric-
tions enabled the administration to avoid the question whether the Presi-
dent had the authority to negotiate an orderly marketing agreement de-
spite the ITC finding that imports were not a substantial cause of injury
to the affected industry.14
Inevitably, the arrangement was criticized by disadvantaged quarters.
Critics in the United States charged that the limitation would not result
in an improved American product and that, due to the shrinkage in sup-
ply, prices would certainly increase, thus further straining the finances of
the American consumer.15
A. Reaction by Japanese Automakers
According to one estimate, the average profit to the Japanese manu-
facturer on the sale of an automobile in the United States is from 300,000
to 400,000 yen (approximately U.S. $1,300 - $1,800).11 "The present con-
dition in the Japanese market is such that the companies (automakers)
are engaged in all out war and are losing money. They make profits on
exports. Sales to the United States bring in especially big profits .... 11
No. of Passenger Cars












* verified by Japan Automobile Manufacturers Association, Inc., 1980 Exports by Destina-
tion. See also, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and
Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 63-66 (1980).
14 See Birenbaum & Tellis, supra note 9.
15 Id.
16 Assuming an exchange rate of approximately 225 yen = 1 b.S. dollar.
" See Mainichi Shinbun, June 25, 1981.
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If this account is accurate, income lost by the companies due to the ex-
port restrictions may be staggering.1 8 Reaction by the automakers to the
restrictions was swift and bitter (although one must assume that this re-
action was orchestrated beforehand). 19 The particularly ironic twist is
that the Japanese manufacturers were subject to restrictions by their own
Government after the U.S. International Trade Commission pronounced
that their exports to the United States did not constitute a substantial
18 It is assumed that, as a result of the reduced supply, manufacturers and dealers of
Japanese automobiles will be enabled to increase prices and substitute auto models with a
higher rate of profit per vehicle. If we further assume that automobiles of Japanese manu-
facture constitute a separate market (presumably, due to perceptions of differences in quali-
ty), and make other assumptions concerning the ease of making price increases, we can con-
struct a theoretical model in which total profits of such manufacturers and dealers are
increased as a result of the restrictions.
According to standard cartel theory, profits of cartel members are maximized when they
act together as a monopolist. Except under aberrant conditions, the monopolist reduces vol-
ume of production from that which would take place under free competition. Cartel mem-
bers with a shared monopoly should act in the same way. However, there is strong incentive
for members to cut prices below those agreed upon. According to Professor Stigler, "Fixing
market shares is probably the most efficient of all methods of combatting secret price reduc-
tions." Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly in EcONoMic ANALYSIS AND ANTrrRUST LAW 124
(Calvani & Siegfried eds. 1979). Thus, in administering volume restrictions to all Japanese
automakers, MITI acts as the ideal enforcer of the cartel. See generally R. POSNER, Eco-
NoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 195-209 (2d ed. 1977).
However, Japanese auto.nakers' ability to raise prices will be circumscribed by competi-
tion among themselves (within volumes allocated), by competition from other auto manu-
facturers, by concerns of long-term market position, and a host of other factors. In view of
such factors, it would seem unlikely that prices can be raised sufficiently to enable reduced
export volume to result in increased profit. Concerning any shift to export of larger, more
profitable vehicles, Japanese automakers have always had the freedom to make this move.
Assuming availability of sufficient production capacity, they would be free to challenge U.S.
makers in the luxury vehicle market while maintaining their strong position in the sale of
small cars. Volume restriction, however, entails a sacrifice in either sector or both.
Further, in evaluating the compulsory aspect of the restrictions, the possibility exists
that the prime objective of the Japanese business organization may be expansion rather
than profit maximization. If this is true it would mean that export restrictions have a
greater impact on Japanese business than might be expected in the profit-oriented West.
For a thorough presentation of the thesis that business expansion is the primary goal of the
Japanese organization, see Drucker, Economic Realities and Enterprise Strategy in MOD-
ERN JAPANESE ORGANIZATION AND DECISION-MAKING 228-48 (E. Vogel ed. 1975).
19 See accounts in the Japanese press of May 2, 1981. See e.g., Asahi Shinbun which on
May 2, 1981, published the statements of the irrate presidents of Nissan and Toyota, Ja-
pan's two largest auto manufacturers. Aside from reduced sales and lost profits, major rea-
sons for their objections included: 1) the ITC decision, 2) changes in the U.S. automobile
market as General Motors began sales of its "J car," 3) the manufacturers' professed belief
that restriction of Japanese sales would have no effect on the performance of U.S. industry




cause of injury to American industry. 0
B. Enforcement of the Restrictions
In view of the resulting loss of profits and market share, compliance
with the restrictions can hardly be deemed to be a fully voluntary act.21
The letter addressed to the U.S. Attorney General states that the mea-
sures would be "put into practice through written directives setting the
maximum number of exportable units. '22 It has been reported that writ-
ten directives which carefully track the language of Ambassador
Okawara's letter have been issued to the automakers. However, there is
no statutory provision in Japanese law explicitly authorizing the Japanese
Government to issue such written directives.2 3 As authority for its action,
the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) cites Article 3
of the law establishing the Ministry24 and Article 48 of the Foreign Ex-
change and Foreign Trade Control Law.2 5 These provisions are drafted in
very broad terms and do not mention written directives or punishment
for disobedience. Therefore, the Japanese Government has not yet em-
ployed any statutory procedure which explicitly authorizes issuance of a
binding order. The use of an informal request in place of the exercise of
statutory authority is standard administrative practice in Japan. This
practice is termed "administrative guidance. '26 Whether administrative
guidance can constitute a binding order as a matter of Japanese law is
unresolved.
The great difference between the typical case of administrative gui-
dance and the automobile case is found in the text of the letter to the
Attorney General and in the "written directives." These documents
demonstrate a public commitment by the Japanese Government to en-
force export controls in a manner expressly provided by statute in the
20 See Birenbaum & Tellis, supra note 9.
21 Clearly, compliance is voluntary in the sense of a choice of the lesser evil. The danger
of more restrictive protectionist legislation is an ever-present consideration.
22 See infra, Appendix B. Allotments to individual companies presented a knotty prob-
lem for MITI and gave rise to a second wave of criticism by the two largest producers.
According to press accounts, 99 percent of the total numer of vehicles available for export
was allotted on the basis of a weighted average of exports during the years 1979 and 1980,
with 1980 weighted at three to four times the 1979 volume. The remaining 1 percent was left
for MITI to grant in its discretion. It is reported that this I percent (16,500 automobiles)
was alloted to Isuzu to reflect a recent drop in sales due to a rearrangement of distribution
in the United States. The single largest shareholder in Isuzu is the General Motors Com-
pany. See, e.g., Sankei Shinbun, June 24, 1981.
2 See infra Section on Administrative Guidance at 68.
24 See infra Appendix A at 74.
21 See infra note 79.
2 See infra Section on Administrative Guidance at 68.
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event that its "directives" issued through administrative guidance are dis-
obeyed. In the typical case, no such public commitment is made. The au-
tomobile case has seen the creation of a new procedure in Japanese ad-
ministrative law to fulfill the perceived requirements of U.S. law.
III. EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF U.S. LAW AND THE ExEMPTION
FOR ACTS COMPELLED BY FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS
A. In General
Under the condition of a market freely open to import, the authori-
ties charged with the enforcement of a competition policy are given the
choice of imposing that policy upon actions of market participants, even
though taken in foreign jurisdictions, or imposing the policy solely against
domestic practices. The latter approach bears the potential result that
domestic competitors will be placed at a competitive disadvantage in
comparison with their foreign rivals.
American courts have emphatically chosen the first alternative. The
best known theoretical expression of this attitude is styled the Effects
Doctrine."7 The core of the Doctrine has been expressed as follows:
"[A]ny state may impose liabilities even upon persons not within its alle-
giance for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its
borders which the state reprehends. '2 8
In the commercial context, unimpeded application of this simple
principle would permit American courts to investigate business activities
taking place in any corner of the world, if such activity would have an
impact on U.S. commerce. This is evenhanded administration of commer-
cial justice in virginal form.
The Effects Doctrine has been subject to heavy criticism. 2 The crux
of the attack has been that effects on the U.S. marketplace constitute
only one consideration to be weighed in the decision whether to subject
actions taking place in foreign jurisdictions to the requirements of U.S.
law. The result of the theoretical controversy is that it is unclear what
general standard should apply to determine when a U.S. court should ex-
27 The United States is not the sole proponent of the extraterritorial application of
competition law based on effects in the national market. See, e.g., 1 WORLD LAW OF COMPE-
TITION, WESTERN EUROPE, (J. Von Kalinowski gen. ed. 1979) [verified by author]; Deringer,
Extraterritorial Application of Antitrust Law-Modern Trends, 6 THE INT'L CONTRAcr
-LAW & FIN. REV. 323 (1980) [verified by author]. However, the American system is by far
the most aggressive in application. The topic of extraterritorial application of competition
laws was considered at length by representatives of the International Chamber of Commerce
held in Paris in March 1981. For a short report on this conference, see 2 Bus. L. REV. 201
(1981).
28 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
29 See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977).
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ercise jurisdiction in this international context.
Whatever the general standard may be, the courts have developed a
relatively settled exception to its application which exempts the acts of
sovereign States from scrutiny under U.S. law and further exempts acts
of private parties that may be compelled by sovereign States. A short
summary of the leading case propounding a broader test than the general
standard announced by the pure Effects Doctrine will be given, followed
by a discussion of the exception. The exception is itself conventionally
expressed as two subdivisions termed the "Act of State" and "Sovereign
Compulsion" Doctrines. It is the latter which has the most direct bearing
on the automobile case.
B. Beyond Effects
The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America N.T. & S.A.30 leads the attack on the
pure Effects Doctrine. The plaintiffs in Timberlane attacked a conspiracy
alleged to have taken place in Honduras which had both the purpose and
effect of restricting exports of lumber to the United States. The action
was based on sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, and on the Wilson
Tariff Act.3 1 In addition to other factual allegations, the plaintiffs alleged
that an officer appointed pursuant to Honduran law to oversee certain
assets in dispute along with other employees of the Honduran Govern-
ment were parties to the conspiracy.
3 2
The impact of the Honduran actions on the U.S. market was mani-
fest. In addition the participation of a foreign government was asserted.
Thus the court was faced with the need to reexamine both the Effects
Doctrine and the Act of State Doctrine. The court emphatically rejected
the Effects Doctrine and proposed its own three-step standard in its
place:
We conclude, then, that the problem should be approached in three
parts: Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the
foreign commerce of the United States? Is it of such a type and magni-
tude so as to be cognizable as a violation of the Sherman Act? As a mat-
30 Id.
" Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7. Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 8-11.
32 Acting through the interventor, [a Honduran judicial mentioned above] since
accused of being on the payroll of the Bank, guards and troops were used to crip-
ple and, for a time, completely shut down Timberlane's milling operation. The
harassment took other forms as well: the conspirators caused the manager of
Timberland's Honduras operations, Gordon Sloan Smith, to be falsely arrested
and imprisoned and were responsible for the publication of several defamatory
articles about Timberlane in the Honduran press.
Timberlane 549 F.2d 597 at 605.
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ter of international comity and fairness, should the extraterritorial juris-
diction of the United States be asserted to cover it? 33
Under the Timberlane standard, the element of effect, whether ac-
tual or intended, becomes a threshold consideration. This initial concern
may be subdivided into two parts: is the effect sufficient to provide sub-
ject matter jurisdiction?; and, is the effect "sufficiently large to present a
cognizable injury to the plaintiffs?" 4 The last part of the test presents
the issues of international comity and fairness, and allows the greatest
room for the subjective input of the decisionmakers. The court regarded
this as a balancing-test resolution to a conflict of laws problem. To de-
scribe its rule, the court cited Kingman Brewster's term, "jurisdictional
rule of reason,"' 5 and found direct support along with a list of factors to
be examined in the Restatement Second of Foreign Relations.6 The es-
sence of the third part of the test is an evaluation of the relative involve-
ment and concern of each State which has an interest in regulating the
activity; this results in an identification of "the potential degree of con-
flict if American authority is asserted . . . Having assessed the conflict,
the court should then determine whether in the face of such conflict the
contacts and interests of the United States are sufficient to support the
exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction. '3 7
13 Id. at 615. The Timberlane court reversed a lower court's dismissal of the case
"under the act of state doctrine and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." Id. at 601. The
test applied by the trial court was uncertain. See the appellate court's statements id. at 607-
08 and 614-15 for indications of its receptivity toward trying the case in the United States.
34 Id. at 613.
"Factors to be evaluated in applying Professor Brewster's rule include the following.
(a) the relative significance to the violations charged of conduct within the United
States as compared with conduct abroad; (b) the extent to which there is explicit
purpose to harm or affect American consumers or Americans' business opportuni-
ties; (c) the relative seriousness of effects on the United States compared with
those abroad; (d) the nationality or allegiance of the parties or in the case of busi-
ness associations, their corporate location, and the fairness of applying our law to
them; (e) the degree of conflict with foreign laws and policies, and (f) the extent to
which conflict can be avoided without serious impairment of the interests of the
United States or the foreign country.
K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD 446 (1958).
"The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law or
policy, the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal
places of businesses or corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either
state can be expected to achieve compliance, the relative significance of effects on
the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is
explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the relative importance to
the violation charged of conduct within the United States as compared with con-
duct abroad.




The opinion clearly indicates that the potential conflict of greatest
concern to the Timberlane court is a conflict between governments. In its
discussion of the Act of State Doctrine, the court cites Banco Nacional de
Cuba38 and affixes the source of that Doctrine to "the judiciary's concern
for its possible interference with the conduct of foreign affairs by the po-
litical branches of government."39 The court quoted a balancing test pro-
vided by Sabbatino: "the less important the implications of an issue are
for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification for exclusivity in the
political branches. '40 The court then extended this concept to the treat-
ment of "the general problems of extraterritoriality."4 1
The Japanese automobile export restrictions were created through an
exercise of diplomacy.42 The Japanese Government requested and re-
ceived a written statement from the U.S. Department of Justice giving its
opinion that Japanese automakers acting in compliance would'not violate
U.S. law. 43 If we assume that the negotiations undertaken by the U.S.
Government to persuade the Japanese Government to adopt such restric-
tions were themselves lawful," then the standard and rationale of
Timberlane would appear to bar any subsequent examination of those
restrictions by courts of the United States. The "degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy" 45 would be extreme.
0
C. The Act of State and Sovereign Compulsion Doctrines
1. Acts of Foreign Governments
The closely related issues of international comity, fairness to private
parties who may be subject to the conflicting demands of different gov-
ernments, and limits of judicial power become critical when the actions of
foreign governments are called into question under U.S. law or are en-
twined with the actions of private parties involved in litigation in the
United States. Any court of law must recognize a practical limitation
when confronting the actions of sovereign authorities. American courts
38 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
3 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 607.
4o Id.
41 Id. at 613.
42 See supra, text surrounding note 13.
43 The legal effect of such a letter considered in the abstract is a matter of speculation.
The Department has established a regular "Business Review Letter" procedure to deal with
less extraordinary situations. Such business review letters carry the Department's opinion
on the legality of proposed business operations, but are not binding. See Antitrust Division
Business Review Procedure, 28 C.F.R. § 50.6 (1980).
44 See Trade Act, supra note 8, at §§ 2251-53. See also Consumers Union, 506 F.2d at
143, and supra text surrounding notes 10 and 11.
4' See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 516.
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have developed a theory to describe this practical limitation under which
the acts of foreign sovereigns are not subject to scrutiny under U.S. law,
even if they produce effects in the United States.4" The natural corollary
to the rule is that the acts of private parties taken within a foreign juris-
diction, and compelled by the sovereign authority in that jurisdiction, are
also exempt from attack under American law. This corollary is generally
referred to as the Doctrine of Sovereign Compulsion. It is expressed by
one commentator through use of this comparison:
There are three possible situations in relation to the defense that the
acts complained of are those of a foreign sovereign: (1) foreign law or
executive authority requires or directs the acts or contracts in question;
(2) foreign law or executive authority acquiesces in such acts or con-
tracts; or (3) foreign law does not prohibit such acts or contracts. 47
This commentator goes on to state that a rule has evolved from case
law to the effect that "a defense based upon acts of a foreign sovereign
cannot be supported by anything less than (1) supra .... ,48
41 See id. at 605-6.
41 W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 76 (2d ed. 1973).
,18 Id. The Mannington Mills court, Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595
F.2d 1287, (3d Cir. 1979) stated,
Where the governmental action rises no higher than mere approval, the compul-
sion defense will not be recognized. It is necessary that foreign law must have
coerced the defendant into violating American antitrust law. The defense is not
available if the defendant could have legally refused to accede to the foreign
power's wishes.
Id.
The U.S. Department of Justice guide, states the following in a discussion of a sovereign
compulsion hypothetical: "Offshore may have a sovereign compulsion defense if C (a foreign
government), acting in conformity with its own law, requires Offshore to observe the terms
of the cartel for its acts solely within C's territory." The Department lists the following
requirements to the defense:
A major limitation is territorial. Although the U.S. courts will recognize an anti-
trust defense for actions taken or compelled by a foreign sovereign within its terri-
tory, such recognition will not be afforded with respect to an act inside the United
States. The situation in third countries is less clear. A second limitation is that the
action upon which the defense is based must be the act of a truly sovereign entity
within the scope of its powers under the law of its nationality. The valid decree of
a foreign government usually meets this requirement; the action of a nongovern-
mental agent of a foreign government does not, at least when it is not proved that
such an agent clearly was authorized to perform the alleged acts of state as a
delegated sovereign function. Third, the act of state defense does not apply to the
commercial actions of a foreign government or instrumentality, but only to its
public, political actions. And underlying the foreign compulsion defense is a bal-
ancing of the comity interests of Restatement § 40 as well as the question whether
the company is being reasonable in doing what it felt it had to do.
ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS at 54-5 (rev. Mar. 1, 1977). In the auto-
mobile case, the action was taken in Japan and clearly involved the government acting in its
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This theory appears to balance the dictates of U.S. law with the need
to recognize the authority of the foreign sovereign and therefore to pro-
tect private parties from being penalized for acts carried out without free-
dom of choice under the direction of sovereign authority. Application of
the theory turns on interpretation of the terms "requires or directs." De-
termining whether or not an action has been directed may at times be a
difficult task. No two governments apply identical means of implementing
policy. The form of "direction" issued by foreign governments to their
citizens may not be easily recognized in documentary form. In addition,
at times officials of foreign governments may compel action in a manner
not clearly authorized by any statute. The interest of fairness commands
that "compulsion" be defined to include a broader category of circum-
stances than merely the issuance of written orders provided for by law.
However, if the exemption is so broadened, the inquiry may become lost
in a tangle of considerations including the structure of law in the country
involved, the status accorded its officials, the power (de facto and de jure)
those officials possess to punish the uncooperative, the form of expression
used by the officials involved, and other factors that combine to create
the environment in which the acts complained of took place. To sort out
this tangle and arrive at a fair evaluation of the circumstances may re-
quire an immense expenditure of judicial energy in a court unfamiliar
with the law and established practices governing the actions examined.
Conversely, to limit the rule to formal situations in which foreign
governments have issued express orders backed by sanctions for noncom-
pliance is to ignore the de facto power of sovereignty (including its power
to adopt extra legal means of expressing its will) and to potentially cause
great injustice to individual defendants. If U.S. law is to be applied to
foreign persons acting under the supervision of foreign authorities, a
method must be found by which judicial efforts are efficiently employed
in the examination of such circumstances without sacrificing policy objec-
tives. Two such methods which are readily apparent are inquiry directly
to the foreign government concerned and evaluation of the defendant's
actions in light of its own commercial interests.
2. Statements by Foreign Governments*
The most economical method of determining whether a foreign gov-
ernment compelled the action of a private party is to address the ques-
tion directly to the government involved. In fact, foreign governments are
official capacity. The only apparent question under the foregoing requirements is whether
the government "required" the action.
* This section of the paper was prepared entirely by Mr. Repeta and does not necessarily
reflect the views of Professor Matsushita.
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capable of entering these deliberations with a great deal of enthusiasm.
Leading examples are found in the Swiss Watchmakers case,49 in which
the Swiss Confederation submitted a brief as amicus curiae,50 and the
color television litigation,51 in which the Japanese Government submitted
a statement52 through diplomatic channels to a U.S. district court.5 3
The amicus brief in the Swiss Watchmaker case indicated that ac-
tion was taken "at the behest and with the encouragement of the Swiss
Confederation"54 and that application of U.S. antitrust law "would in-
fringe Swiss sovereignty." 55
The statement involved in the latter case describes the participation
of MITI in the establishment of a cartel governing the export of Japanese
televisions. In this document one finds the statements that MITI "di-
rected" establishment of the export cartel and that "the Japanese televi-
sion manufacturers and exporters had no alternative but to establish the
agreement and regulation in compliance with the said direction."5 "
These examples, as well as the legislative reactions cited above,57 il-
lustrate that foreign governments give little sympathy to the efforts of
American courts to enforce U.S. law against the activities of nationals of
those States when the activities are carried out within the borders of the
affected States. As-a result, one can readily conclude that foreign govern-
ments should be disqualified as arbiters of whether they "directed or re-
quired" the activities of the defendants on both objective and subjective
grounds.
If "direct or require" is to be a standard in U.S. law, then it requires
application by a U.S. tribunal. To delegate the task to foreign govern-
ments is to request a multiplicity of interpretations. Such statements can-
not be given preclusive effect because foreign governments are not
equipped to apply the standard. Furthermore, it is submitted that in
4' United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 134 F.
Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
50 We have relied on a quotation from this brief reproduced in H. STEIaNR & D. VAGTS,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS, 957-58 (1st ed. 1968).
1 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
[hereinafter cited as Zenith].
52 Infra, Appendix A at 74.
" The Zenith court did not reach the issues presented by the statement, granting sum-
mary judgment to defendants. Zenith, 513 F. Supp. 1100. The purpose of discussion of the
statement in the opinion is to serve as reference for the Appeals court. Aside from its signifi-
cance in the color television case, id. this policy statement may be thought of as a full dress
rehearsal for the Ministry's preparation of the statement dispatched to the U.S. Attorney
General in the automobile case. Id. at 1194 n.123.
114 See STEINER & VAGTS, supra note 50, at 957.
55 Id.
'6 See infra, Appendix A at 76, 77.
11 See supra note 5 and surrounding text.
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most cases such statements should be subject to close scrutiny and per-
haps should have no greater weight than the statement of an interested
party.
Foreign governments are generally incapable of objectivity in these
cases for several reasons. The first is the delicate issue of sovereignty.
Most States have adopted a concept of jurisdiction based on territoriality
rather than effect. Such States are naturally affronted by any attempt to
extend foreign authority to actions taken within their territories. This af-
front becomes more serious when the foreign government itself was in-
volved in the actions attacked, either through its "direction" or through
acquiescence. Secondly, if it is known that the foreign government was
involved in some fashion, then it is implicated in the action under scru-
tiny. Another significant factor is domestic pressure to support home in-
dustry which may be penalized under a foreign law that is vague and con-
fusing, and which may have the undesirable effect of restricting exports.
Lastly, it should be noted that the statement is likely to be made by the
executive or administrative branch of the foreign government and will be
descriptive of the actions of some office of that government.
Such statements are of uncertain value when considering the compel-
ling nature of the action when taken. However, they do have value as an
indication of the current interest in the case shown by the foreign govern-
ment and therefore aid in the application of the third part of the
Timberlane standard to identify "the potential degree of conflict if Amer-
ican authority is asserted."5' A strong statement by a foreign government
coupled with other factors which, would undermine the propriety of hear-
ing the case in the United States might lead a court to conclude that it
should decline jurisdiction.5"
3. The Commercial Interests of the Defendant
In many cases, whether the request or order is in harmony with the
commercial interests of the defendant will be readily apparent. If the con-
tent of the request or order of a foreign government is contrary to the
commercial interests of the defendant, his compliance therewith is strong
evidence of its compelling nature. This appears to have been the guiding
rationale in the Interamerican Refining case.60
In Interamerican, the defendants were charged with conspiring to
destroy a potentially profitable oil refining business by refusing to sell
58 Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
09 Under the current practice, prior to examining any such statement, the court must
identify and confirm the authority of the issuing body in order to represent the government
concerned. See Zenith, 513 F.Supp. at 1194 n.123.
60 Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. DeL
1970).
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crude oil to the .plaintiff. The defendants did not deny either the refusals
or the injury. 1 They sought to escape liability on the ground that the
Venezuelan Government forbad them from dealing with the plaintiff. The
court held that the defendants were compelled by Venezuelan regulatory
authorities to boycott the plaintiff and that this amounted to a complete
defense.
62
The court found that all foreign firms selling Venezuelan petroleum
were required to be licensed by a government ministry and that the min-
istry had established a commission to supervise this activity. Violation of
the rules of the commission could result in suspension of the right to con-
duct business.6"
The commission verbally "instructed" the defendants to refrain from
selling to the plaintiff. Unfortunately, the details of the discussion are not
clear from the opinion. The primary (perhaps sole) reason for suspension
appears to have been that the principal shareholders in the plaintiff cor-
poration were political opponents of the Venezuelan administration then
in power.
The plaintiff submitted as evidence the affidavit of a Venezuelan at-
torney indicating that the ministry had no authority to issue binding or-
ders without reducing them to writing and publishing them in the Gazeta
Official." The court decided that the issue of the legality of the orders
was irrelevant. Furthermore, the court neither defined "order," nor did it
explain exactly why the "orders" were compulsory. 5 The court showed no
concern for the legal requirements for the issuance of orders and the
opinion does not disclose the wording by which this "order" was ex-
pressed. A reading of the opinion suggests that the key to the court's de-
cision is that no evidence was offered tending to show that a termination
of business with the plaintiff was in the interest of the defendant. In sum-
mary, the court stated:
The relationship among supplier, trader, and refiner was essentially
symbiotic, profitable to all, and nothing supports any other theory. What
the uncontradicted evidence does show is that the defendants were eager
to sell to plaintiff, and that they acted in good faith before and after the
ban, and that all refusals to deal were based on compliance with author-
ity which was in the words of Professor Brewster, 'in fact, a sine qua non
of doing business.66
61 Id. at 1294.
62 Id. at 1296.
63 Id. at 1295.
14 Id. at 1298.
" ". . . the factual inquiry is limited to the existence of the officer and the order. Once





The court found that the defendants had terminated a business that
had been profitable. The reason for termination was deemed to be secon-
dary to the fact that the defendants chose to submit despite the loss en-
tailed. Certainly, such a choice by a defendant in a U.S. court should not
preclude that court's independent inquiry into the compulsory nature of
the order. It is clear though that the defendant's decision to act in a man-
ner contrary to its monetary interests should be accorded great weight in
determination whether that act was compelled.
IV. JAPANESE STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR RESTRICTION OF EXPORTS
Regulation of Japanese exports is provided under Japanese law
through two major statutes, the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law (Control Law) 7 and the Export and Import Transactions
Law (Transactions Law),"8 along with the regulations promulgated there-
under. Both statutes are administered by MITI, although action under
either may require an order of the Cabinet. Implementation of the stat-
utes is subject to scrutiny under Article 22 of the Constitution which es-
tablishes the general principle of freedom to choose one's occupation.69
A. Requirement of Approval for Export
Article 48 of the Control Law states that persons who would export
designated goods or who would export to a designated destination may be
required to obtain the approval of MITI, as provided by Cabinet Order.7 0
In order to establish an approval requirement under this statute, cer-
tain conditions must be fulfilled: the requirement must be established by
'7 Gaikoku kawase oyobi gaikoku boeki no kanri ni kansuru horitsu (Foreign Exchange
and Foreign Trade Control Law) Law No. 228 of 1949, translated in 5 EMuN-HoREi SHA
LAW BULL. SERIES AA and in JAPAN, LAWS, ORDINANCES AND OTHER REGULATIONS CONCERN-
ING FOREIGN EXCHANGE AND FOREIGN TRADE, Chuo Shappan Kikaku, pp. A-1-A-41 [hereinaf-
ter cited as Control Law]. Major amendments to the Control Law with the purpose of liber-
alizing control of foreign transactions came into effect in December of 1980, however, the
amendments did not affect procedures discussed herein. For an overview of the amendments
see Kaname Seki, The Amendment of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Thereof 2
JAPAN BUS. L.J. 29 (1980) [verified by author].
" Yushutsunyi torihiki ho (Export and Import Transactions Law), Law No. 290 of
1952, amended in 1965, translated in 1974 JAPAN FOREIGN TRADE NEWS at 348-73 (spec. ed.)
[verified by author] [hereinafter cited as Transactions Law].
11 See Haley, The Freedom to Choose an Occupation and the Constitutional Limits of
Legislative Discretion, 8 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 188 (1975).
70 Control Law, supra note 67, at art. 48(1), reads as follows:
Any person desiring to export goods from Japan may be required to obtain the
approval of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry for those types or
areas of destination of export goods and/or method of transactions or payments as
provided by Cabinet Order.
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a published Cabinet Order, it must be issued to serve the purposes for
such an approval requirement expressed by the statute, and it must be
cast in terms that cause no greater restriction on free export than is nec-
essary to serve the purposes for such requirements expressed by the
statute.
The effect of the first condition is that the decision to require an
approval must be made or approved by the Cabinet in writing. The .Cabi-
net Order should specify the subject goods or destinations. Once the Cab-
inet has so ordered, the authority of MITI extends to decisions whether
to issue approvals in specific cases.
The second and third requirements derive from the adoption of the
principle of free export, expressed in Article 47 of the Control Law and
from provisions of the Control Law and the Export Trade Control Order
related specifically to establishment of an approval requirement.
Article 47 of the Control Law provides that the "export of goods
from Japan shall be permitted with the minimum restrictions thereon
consistent with the objective of this Law. 71 In cases where the establish-
ment of an approval requirement is authorized, Article 48(2) of the Con-
trol Law requires that such a requirement be framed "within the limit of
necessity for the maintenance of the balance of international payments
and the sound development of international trade or national economy.1 2
' Once established by a Cabinet Order, the license requirement is to be
administered by the Minister of MITI. The Minister is empowered by
Article 1 of the Export Trade Control Order to deny export licenses or to
attach conditions to their approval. 3 Denial and attachment of condi-
tions to licenses are authorized only in cases where the Minister has de-
termined that the requirements of purpose and minimal restriction de-
scribed above are served by such denials or conditions.7 4 Neither the
Control Law nor the Export Trade Control Order specifies the nature of
conditions that may be attached to approvals by the Minister.
71 Id. at art. 47. The MITI denial of an export license has been declared unlawful in one
decision by the Tokyo District Court on the ground that its denial (to prevent export of
items subject to strategic control under the Consultative Group Coordinating Committee
Agreement (COCOM), to which Japan is a party) was outside the scope of the purposes of
the Control Law and Export Trade Control Order. The COCOM decision is discussed in
Matsushita, Export Control and Export Cartels in Japan, 20 HARVARD INT'L L. J. 103, 106-
08 (1979).
7. Id. at art. 48(2).
7 Export Trade Control Order (Yushutsu b'oeki kanrirei) 5 EmUN HOREISHA L. BULL.
SERIES AJ-2 and at Chuo Shuppan Kikkaku, supra note 67, at C-1-C-62. Such decisions are
appealable under the Administrative Cases Litigation Law. For a discussion of the issue of
administrative discretion and a translation of a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Japan on the issue, see Miyazaki, The Political Rights of Aliens in Japan and Compulsory
Deportation, 12 LAW IN JAPAN 82 (1979).
74 Id. at art. 1(6).
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Price and quantity restrictions have been the most common forms of
export restriction employed by MITI.75 The former has come to be re-
ferred to as the "check price." Its major purpose is to set a minimum
export price in order to prevent dumping. Quantitative restrictions take
the form of an allocation among exporters ordinarily determined on the
basis of past export volume adjusted to reflect other factors. This type of
format is employed in the quantity restrictions in the automobile case .7
The letter of Ambassador Okawara to the Attorney General of May
7, 1981, states that if:
it becomes clear that any company threatens to exceed the limits set
forth by MITI, the Government of Japan will promptly make car exports
to the U.S. subject to export approvals, by amending the Export Trade
Control Order (Cabinet Order No. 378 of 1949) in accordance with Arti-
cle Forty-eight (48) of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control
Law. MITI would then enforce the export maximums it had established
for each company by refusing to license exports in excess of those
maximums .
7
Under the circumstances, it appears certain that such restrictions are
"within the limits of necessity for. . . the sound development of interna-
tional trade." Therefore the restrictions are within the purposes of the
Control Law and the Japanese Government is legally empowered to pro-
ceed. What may be curious to the non-Japanese observer is that MITI
has chosen not to employ these measures at the present stage. Rather, the
Ministry has decided to achieve the same result informally, through ad-
ministrative guidance with the statutory measures available in the event
that the informal guidance is not followed.
B. Export Cartels
The purposes of the Transactions Law are to prevent unfair export
transactions7 and to ensure order in export and import transactions. In
relation to exports, the statute is designed to achieve these purposes
71 Other restrictions include transaction alignment by requiring a set route of export;
safety and sanitation rules based on certain safety and sanitation standards; design regula-
tions to prevent possible infringement of intangible property rights in the destination coun-
tries; and payment terms and recovery of credit by imposing an obligation to comply with
certain conditions in order to secure smooth recovery of credit or prevent worsening of pay-
ment terms of cases if plant exportation under deferred payment.
76See infra, Appendix B at 78-79.
77 Id. at 78.
7 Unfair practices designated in the statute include infringements of intangible prop-
erty rights (in the country of import), false indications of origin, export in violation of an
export agreement, and other practices contrary to "Fair commercial practice in international
transactions" and designated by Cabinet Order. Transactions Law, supra note 68, at art. 2.
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through the use of export cartels. There are two types of cartels: agree-
ments among exporters or manufacturers of goods to be exported ("Cartel
Agreements"), and terms stipulated by export associations to be followed
by their members ("Export Associations").
1. Cartel Agreements
Article 5 of the Transactions Law authorizes conclusion of cartel
agreements by exporters to govern prices, quantities, quality, designs, and
other terms of sale of specified goods in specified designations. The same
provision requires notification to the Minister of MITI 10 days prior to
conclusion of the agreement.79 The statute requires the Minister to pro-
hibit or order amendments in agreements that come within any six cate-
gories of objections set forth in the statute.80 The statute does not grant
the Minister the authority to prohibit or order amendment if the agree-
ment does not come within the scope of any of these objections, nor does
the statute grant the Minister the power to order formation or participa-
tion in such agreements.
Thus, in the automobile case, if the Japanese Government had
wanted the automakers to enter a cartel agreement restricting export
guaranties, it would have had to persuade the companies to do so either
voluntarily or under threat of action under the Control Law if they failed
to cooperate. The Government would not have had authority to directly
order such action.
The statute does not mandate positive conditions for the establish-
ment of a cartel, but limits itself to stating negative conditions. This for-
mat is consistent with the statutory theme of leaving the initiative for the
commencement of cartels with its members and allotting to MITI a su-
pervisory role. If the agreement fails to meet any of the following criteria,
MITI must issue an order amending or prohibiting the agreement before
it is concluded:
(1) there must be no likelihood that the agreement will violate any trea-
ties or other arrangements concluded with a foreign government or inter-
national organization; (2) there must be no likelihood that the agreement
will harm the interests of importers or related dealers in the place of
destination, nor markedly harm the international reliability of Japanese
exporters; (3) there must be no likelihood that the agreement will ham-
per the sound development of export trade; (4) the agreement must not
be unreasonably discriminatory in content; (5) there must be no unrea-
sonable restrictions on participation in or withdrawal from the agree-
ment; and (6) there must be no likelihood that the agreement will unrea-
70 Id. at art. 5(1).
80 Id. at art. 5(2).
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sonably harm the interests of domestic competitors of the participants or
the interests of enterprises engaged in protected domestic industries such




Export associations organized under the Transactions Law are non-
profit8 2 juristic persons.8 3 Freedom to join or leave the association must
be provided for in its articles of incorporation, and members must have
equal rights of decisionmaking and voting." Members must be either ex-
porters or other export associations 5 and must meet the requirements, in
addition to those specified by law, that the articles of incorporation of
export associations may stipulate.86 In addition to determining whether a
member is engaged in "unfair export transactions,' 8 7 export associations
may decide to limit competition among their members by filing a notifica-
tion with MITI at least 10 days before establishing an export agreement
that restricts the price, quality, or design of goods exported by members
to certain destinations.88 Export associations come into existence upon
the issuance of a license by MITI, and are subject to the same negative
conditions as Cartel Agreements." As in the case of the Cartel Agree-
ment, the government has no power to order their formation. Rather, it
uses administrative guidance to persuade companies to form such
associations.
3. Administrative Orders in Enforcement of Cartels
In those cases where an export cartel has been formed under the
Transactions Law, the Minister of MITI may, by ministerial order issued
pursuant to Cabinet Order, enforce the terms of the cartel against non-
members, or establish and enforce the terms of export independently of
those set by the cartel agreement.90 In either case, the MITI directive
would apply to all exporters of the affected goods being shipped to the
81 Id.
82 Id. at art. 9.
83 Id. at art. 8.
4 Id. at art. 9.
85 Id. at art. 12(1).
88 Id. at art. 12(2).
87 Id. at art. 11(1).
Id. at art. 11(2).
8 Id. at art. 14. MITI is also authorized to order dissolution of an association. Id. art.
18.
Id. at art. 28(1)-(2).
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affected destinations. 1
As conditions precedent to this authority, the statute requires that
(a) exporters have given MITI notice of and have concluded an export
agreement; (b) members of the cartel occupy a substantial percentage in
cash value of transactions in the designated goods and destinations; and
(c) that the Minister of MITI is of the opinion that the export agreement
itself is insufficient to avoid serious difficulties obstructing the "mainte-
nance of order in export transactions" or the "sound development of ex-
port trade. 9
2
The authority may be exercised in either of two formats. The Minis-
ter may simply issue an order specifying terms of export, or he may re-
quire that approval be obtained prior to export of the affected good. The
advantage to the latter is that no public announcment is made concerning
the conditions for approval. MITI is thus enabled to operate on a case by
case basis and maintain the confidentiality of the terms of trade of par-
ties acting under approvals. The sole statutory guideline is that the re-
quirement be imposed "within the minimum scope necessary to elimi-
nate" the obstructions to order and the sound development of exports.
The Minister is further authorized to ban exports in the affected cat-
egory for a period of up to one year by persons who violated the ministe-
rial order which sets export terms or establishes the approval
requirement.98
Due to the informal nature of Japanese administrative practice, it is
not always clear where the initiative to form a cartel arises. The statute
leaves this with the private parties concerned, but in actual practice one
suspects that the formation of cartels is often originally suggested by ad-
mistrative authorities in an attempt to avoid trade friction9 4 (in particu-
lar, minimum prices may be set to avoid dumping charges).9 5 MITI's
statement in relation to the color television case so describes the prac-
tice.96 In order to form an opinion whether such is the practice and
whether it is generally accepted, it is necessary to have a basic under-




93 Id. at art. 28(4).
" Even when exporters agree upon the need for a cartel, they may be unable to agree
on its terms and therefore may rely on MITI to devise terms acceptable to everyone (or to
persuade the unenthusiastic to join).
95 This was the rationale offered for use of the check price system in the Zenith case.
" See infra the portion of the MITI statement at 69-70.
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C. Administrative Guidance in the Implementation of the Control Law
and Transaction Law
Having described the statutory apparatus provided by the Control
Law and Transactions Law, we must now attempt to describe the actual
administrative practice which is not provided by statute. Although both
the Control Law and the Transactions Law grant MITI the power to issue
binding orders in specified situations, such orders are rarely issued. Japa-
nese administrators generally prefer to engage in an informal process of
persuasion, rather than to publicly issue binding orders. This practice is
commonly termed "administrative guidance. 97 Because the practice
avoids employment of binding orders, its success depends on the coopera-
tion of the persons who are subjected to the guidance and, more funda-
mentally, upon their perception that it is in their interest to comply.
The statement.provided by MITI in relation to the color television
cases" is illustrative. In that case, a federal district court examined an
export association established under the Transactions Law. Attorneys for
the defendants argued that MITI had directed both the establishment
and the operation of the association and therefore the defendant mem-
bers of the association were subject to sovereign compulsion forcing com-
pliance with association rules.99 In support of this argument, they offered
the statement of MITI addressed to the court. According to this
statement:
[w]ith respect to the export of television sets to the United States, in
1962 MITI accurately recognized, in view of the importance of televisions
The body of commentary on administrative guidance is immense, even in English.
See, e.g. Narita, Administrative Guidance, 2 LAw iN JAPAN 45 (1968), Yamanouchi, Admin-
istrative Guidance and the Rule of Law, 7 LAW iN JAPAN 22 (1974), Sanekata, Administra-
tive Guidance and the Antimonopoly Law, 10 LAW IN JAPAN 65 (1977), Smith, Prices and
Petroleum in Japan: 1973-1974-A Study of Administrative Guidance, 10 LAW IN JAPAN 81
(1977), Matsushita, Administrative Guidance and Economic Regulation in Japan, 1 JAPAN
Bus. L.J. 209 (1980) [verified by author]. The oft-cited definition of administrative guidance
was made in a 1970 statement by the Japanese Government before the House of Councilors
Commerce and Industry Committee and is translated in Sanekata, supra at 68 as follows:
Administrative guidance does not involve legal authority for enforcement, as
would the case of a restriction of civil rights or the imposition of a duty on the
public. Administrative guidance refers to the function of an administrative
agency-acting within the scope of a duty under the laws establishing the agency
or within the scope of its jurisdiction-to persuade and guide a party to conduct
its business in a certain way, in order to realize an administrative goal through the
party's cooperation.
98 See Zenith, 513 F. Supp. 1100, and infra Appendix A.
9 See Zenith, 513 F. Supp. at 1192. Plaintiffs emphasized the lack of MITI authority
to issue binding orders and the voluntary nature of the arrangements to argue that MITI
intervention did not amount to compulsion. See id. at 1192-93. As stated at note 53 supra,
the court did not decide the issue.
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as one of Japan's export products, the need for assuring their orderly
exportation to avoid the possibility of trade conflicts. Thus, MITI di-
rected Japanese television manufacturers including the present Japanese
defendants to enter into an agreement under Article 5-3 of the Export
and Import Trading Law with respect to minimum prices and other mat-
ters concerning domestic transactions relating to exports to the United
States, and further, directed the exporters to establish a new regulation
to be observed by the members of the export association with respect to
filing of export prices and other related matters, pursuant to the associa-
tion's functions under Article 11, Subparagraph 2 of the same law re-
garding the same exports. MITI supervised the preparation of such
agreements and regulation so that MITI's intention was correctly
reflected."'
As discussed above, the Transactions Law does not expressly provide for
the issuance of a directive to form an export cartel. Failure to follow such
a directive does not amount to a violation of law. However, the MITI
statement goes on to say:
[h]ad the Japanese television manufacturers and exporters failed to com-
ply with MITI's direction to establish such an agreement or regulation,
MITI would have invoked its powers provided for in the Export Trade
Control Order under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control
Law in order to unilaterally control television sales for export to the
United States and carry out its established trade policy."'
According to this description, the Ministry achieved the same result
through administrative guidance as it was empowered to order under the
Control Law. However, by acting informally, the Ministry retained its
flexibility by avoiding the creation of a public record of its action or a
need to demonstrate that its action fulfilled the requirements of any stat-
ute (note the COCOM case). None of the recipients were in a position to
formally complain about the guidance because it did not amount to a
public act subject to judicial review.10 2
The Ministry, nevertheless, describes its action as a directive and, in
such cases, recipients of administrative guidance may sometimes get a
taste of compulsory flavor. Resistance to the informal directive may do no
more than provoke the Ministry into the establishment of a requirement
of Ministry approval. If an approval requirement were imposed, the unco-
operative could hardly expect favorable treatment at the hands of the
Ministry upon application for the required license. The possibility exists
100 See infra, Appendix A at 76.
101 Id.
102 Lastly, it should be noted that the public was denied the opportunity to participate
in or even to be apprised of this public policy. MITI openly disclosed its activity after the
fact only because it was necessitated by the American litigation.
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that the Ministry may inconvenience such persons in other ways as
well.10
3
Administrative guidance is a much discussed topic in Japanese ad-
ministrative law."0 4 It is agreed among the commentators that administra-
tive guidance is a form of government regulation, but it is also agreed
that compliance is not legally required. Although highly important as a
matter of practice, its flexibility necessarily causes difficulty in the at-
tempt to fit the concept into a rigid analytical framework. The result is
that each incident of administrative guidance must be examined within
its own particular context in order to determine its legal effect.
How administrative guidance should be evaluated from the stand-
point of the American law concept of sovereign compulsion is unclear. It
appears safe to say that the persons who formulated that doctrine were
not acquainted with a standard administrative practice in which neither
the administrator nor the administrated are legally bound by their
actions.
There is little to offer for "guidance" from legal commentary in Ja-
pan. Scholars agree that compliance with administrative guidance is le-
gally voluntary, but until now they have been concerned mainly with the
domestic context in which the aspect of coercive nature has not been very
significant.10 5 The leading case concerning its effect under Japanese law is
the 1980 decision of the Tokyo High Court in the Petroleum Cartel
case.106 The decision has not yet been fully digested and incorporated into
the generally accepted body of Japanese administrative law,107 but it will
certainly shape thinking on the subject for the foreseeable future. Certain
language in the opinion suggests that if the Ministry concerned had is-
sued administrative guidance as a standard practice in order to achieve
103 Concerning informal restrictive measures see Yamanouchi, supra note 97, at 25. For
a discussion of the celebrated Sumitomo Metal Mining Company Case, see Narita, supra
note 97, at 57-9. See also HENDERsoN, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN 203 (1973).
I See note 97 supra citations to English language commentary.
105 Whether the actions of a person following administrative guidance are immune from
attack under the Antimonopoly Law is largely a question of statutory interpretation
(whether the provisions of the Antimonopoly Law or those of the regulatory statute should
take precedence) and not whether such actions were compelled. See infra, note 109.
106 Japan v. Petroleum Association, et al, Tokyo High Court, Special Division No. 3,
Sept. 26, 1980, reported at No. 983 HANRFI JINO 22, and Japan v. Idemitsu Kosan, K.K. et
al, Tokyo High Court, Special Division No. 3, Sept. 26, 1980, reported at No. 985 HANEEI
JINo 3.
107 The Petroleum Cartel decisions spawned an extensive re-examination of administra-
tive guidance by Japanese scholars. A convenient listing of commentary by well-known
scholars in the field is provided by Mr. Tokuhiko Ohata of the Fair Trade Commission at
364 KosEi TORIHmK 22, (Feb. 1981). See also "Administrative Guidance Questioned"
(Towareru Gysei Shido), 741 JURISTO, (1981). English language commentary on the case
appears in 14 LAW IN JAPAN (1981, forthcoming).
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the purposes of a regulatory law (the Petroleum Affairs Law),108 parties
acting pursuant to that guidance would have been immune from attack
under the antimonopoly law of Japan. 0 9 It may be argued that this pro-
vides an oblique precedent for the position that persons in similar cir-
cumstances should be immune from attack under American antitrust law.
Needless to say, the standards for the U.S. concept of "compulsion" and
the Japanese law concept of immunity from antimonopoly law differ," 0 as
do the circumstances in which they appear."''
V. CONCLUSION
All Japanese exporters of automobiles to the United States have
agreed to limit the volume of those exports for a period of three years. It
is apparent that no single Japanese producer would have cut back exports
without the assurance that its competitors would do the same. The inevi-
table result will be some degree of scarcity and a likely rise in prices of
Japanese cars in the United States. The program was established by a
ministry of the Government of Japan, after lengthy negotiations with the
U.S. Government. The program is administered without the issuance of
statutory orders to comply and is not described in any law.
Nevertheless, it is unimaginable that any U.S. court would fail to
grant immunity to such a program if attacked under U.S. law. The pro-
gram comports generally with standard Japanese administrative practice
and gives effect to a policy decision of the Japanese Government which
was made under persuasion of the U.S. Government; the amount of the
cutback in exports for each individual producer was decided by the Japa-
nese Government rather than by the exporters. The lost profits and mar-
ket shares along with potential harm to dealership networks are eloquent
testimony to the involuntary nature of the exporters' compliance. Any
failure to grant such immunity would likely lead to an international inci-
dent and would cast serious doubt on the perceived authority of the Pres-
ident to negotiate matters concerning international trade problems.
'1 Sekyugyoh'o (Petroleum Industry Law), Law No. 128 of 1962.
109 In the Petroleum Cartel case, the court did not specifically address the question
whether private parties were compelled to follow administrative guidance. Rather the pri-
vate parties involved proposed plans for production cutbacks and the ministry merely ap-
proved such plans. Further, the Petroleum Affairs Law did not provide MITI with any
means to compel compliance: In the automobile and color television cases, however, the
ministry possessed power under the Control Law to take measures to compel compliance in
the event that it is dissatisfied with industry response to informal communications.
110 See supra text of note 105.
"' E.g., Administrative guidance which may become subject to examination in U.S.
courts will ordinarily be related to the Control Law and Transactions Law. See supra notes
67-8. Actions under these statutes is generally exempt from application of the Antimonopoly
Law. See Matsushita, supra note 71, at 116-120.
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When applying a Timberlane-style standard of extraterritoriality, a
court should acknowledge that exercising jurisdiction in a case such as
this would violate international comity and fairness, and would constitute
an undesirable judicial intrusion into the conduct of foreign affairs. Even
if it chose to exercise jurisdiction, an examination of the heavy involve-
ment of the Japanese Government and the manifest loss resulting to the
exporters as a result of compliance can only lead to a determination that
the restrictions were compelled by a foreign sovereign.
Extraordinary circumstances such as those that surrounded the auto-
mobile controversy are unlikely to be duplicated on a regular basis. One
hopes that cases involving the participation of the U.S. Government in
the creation of export restrictions to the United States will be rare. Also,
the conclusion that in this case actions were compelled by the Japanese
Government does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that actions have
been or will be compelled by that Government every time measures are
taken under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law and
the Export-Import Transactions Law (or with those statutes "in the
background"). To determine whether compulsion is present in any indi-
vidual case requires a close examination of both the manner and the fac-
tual environment in which the administration was implemented.
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The Embassy of Japan presents its compliments to the Department
.of State and has the honor to ask the latter to transfer to the United
States District Court for Eastern District of Pennsylvania the attached
statement concerning the two lawsuits between National Union Electric
Corporation v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. et al. (Civil Action
No. 74-3247); and Zenith Radio Corporation v. Matsushita Electric Co.,
Ltd. et al. (Civil Action No. 74-2451).
Attachment
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry of the Japanese
Government ("MITI") has become aware that a number of Japanese tele-
vision manufacturers and exporters are being sued by National Union
Electric Corporation and Zenith Radio Corporation in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for alleged viola-
tions of various United States antitrust and antidumping laws in connec-
tion with their sales of television sets for export to the United States (Na-
tional Union Electric Corporation v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co.,
Ltd., et al., Civil Action No. 74-3247 and Zenith Radio Corporation v.
Matsushita Electric Co., Ltd., et al., Civil Ation No. 74-2451.) In these
lawsuits, questions have been raised concerning certain agreements en-
tered into among the Japanese defendants, as well as certain regulations
of the Japan Machinery Exporters Association, both such agreements and
regulations have come into existence pursuant to the direction of MITI.
MITI has the honor to express its deep interest and serious concern
regarding these lawsuits which involve issues related to its foreign trade
policy and to call your attention to the following:
1. In order that Japanese exports do not cause unnecessary disruptions
in the national economies of Japan's trading partners, one of the basic
trade policies is to assure that Japanese exporting is carried on in as or-
derly a manner as possible. MITI is the government organ empowered
and responsible for the detailed implementation of the said basic trade
policy. Thus, Article 3 of the Law Concerning the Establishment of MITI
(Law No. 275, 1952) sets forth the following administrative activities as
being under the responsibility of MITI:
(1) Promotion and adjustment of international trade and con-
trol of foreign exchange relating to international trade (Arti-
cle 3, Paragraph 1);
(2) Promotion of international cooperation in international
trade and economic relations (Article 3, Paragraph 1-2).
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Further, Article 4 of the Establishment Law defines the role of MITI
as follows:
(1) Planning and programing of basic policies concerning pro-
duction, distribution, consumption, trading, etc. of goods (in-
cluded is electric power) under its jurisdiction (Article 4,
Sub-section 1, Paragraph 13);
(2) To export and import (Article 4, Sub-section 1, Paragraph
16);
(3) To restrict or prohibit export or import (Article 4, Sub-sec-
tion 1, Paragraph 17);
(4) To take the steps necessary to execute agreements and ar-
rangements concerning international trade (Article 4, Sub-
section 1, Paragraph 18);
(5) To prohibit or restrict transactions, etc. in foreign exchange
relating to international trade (Article 4, Sub-section 1, Par-
agraph 20);
(6) To sanction exporters' agreements, importers' agreements
and agreements of either manufacturers or distributors con-
cerning export products, to sanction matters to be complied
with members of export associations or import associations
(hereinafter referred to as "Association Regulations"), to
sanction collective agreements among the said members and
matters to be complied with members of export-import as-
sociations, and to supervise designated agencies. (Article 4,
Sub-section 1, Paragraph 24);
(7) To exercise such powers, other than those mentioned in the
above items, as are placed under the jurisdiction of MITI by
law (including orders issued thereunder) (Article 4, Sub-sec-
tion 1, Paragraph 51).
2. Endowed with the said responsibilities and powers, MITI has devel-
oped under the law two basic procedures to achieve the aims of trade
policy of the Government of Japan. The first procedure relates to MITI's
regulatory powers provided for under the Export and Import Trading
Law (Law No. 299, 1952) and the second relates to regulatory powers
under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Law No.
228, 1949). The purpose of the Export and Import Trading Law is to pro-
mote the sound development of foreign trade by preventing unfair export
trading and by establishing an orderly system for export and import trad-
ing. The purpose of the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control
Law is to promote the proper development of foreign trade by providing
for the control of foreign exchange, foreign trade and other foreign
transactions.
In order to promote the sound development of foreign trade MITI
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applies both laws as follows: If some measures are deemed necessary to
achieve the purposes mentioned above, MITI will generally first direct
the relevant Japanese industry or trade association to enter into Arrange-
ments (which include both manufacturers' agreements and association
regulations) pursuant to the Export and Import Trading Law.
Where this procedure is deemed to be insufficient for the purpose of
achieving these trade policy objectives (for example, where there is insuf-
ficient time to complete the contemplated arrangements), MITI will exer-
cise its powers provided for in the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet
Order No. 378, 1949) under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law, without prior direction to the industry or trade associations
to enter into such Arrangements.
As stated above, such Arrangements concluded under the Export and
Import Trade Law and carried out under the direction of the Minister of
International Trade and Industry in order to assure orderly Japanese ex-
portation activities are the actual implementation of MITI's trade policy
itself. And since such direction by MITI, if disregarded, can be enforced
by the power pursuant to the said Cabinet Order, it has in fact a compul-
sory power equivalent to law.
Once MITI has decided upon the trade policy measures to be taken
and has directed the establishment of appropriate Arrangements under
the Export and Import Trading Law for this purpose, the Japanese in-
dustries involved have in fact no alternative but to establish them. There-
fore the Arrangements entered into under the Export and Import Trad-
ing Law in compliance with the direction of MITI are not private
agreements in effect and are no less than the implementation of the for-
eign trade policy of MITI, despite their form as agreements made among
private parties.
3. With respect to the export of television sets to the United States, in
1962 MITI accurately recognized, in view of the importance of televisions
as one of Japan's export products, the need for assuring their orderly ex-
portation to avoid the possibility of trade conflicts.
Thus, MITI directed Japanese television manufacturers including the
present Japanese defendants to enter into an agreement under Article 5-3
of the Export and Import Trading Law with respect to minimum prices
and other matters concerning domestic transactions relating to exports to
the United States, and further, directed the exporters to establish a new
regulation to be observed by the members of the export association with
respect to filing of export prices and other related matters, pursuant to
the association's functions under Article 11, Sub-paragraph 2 of the same
law regarding the same exports. MITI supervised the preparation of such
agreements and regulation so that MITI's intention was correctly re-
flected. Such direction and supervision concerning minimum prices at
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which televisions could be sold for exportation to the United States and
other matters were exercised continuously from 1963 until February 28,
1973 when such exporting arrangements were terminated.
4. Had the Japanese television manufacturers and exporters failed to
comply with MITI's direction to establish such an agreement or regula-
tion, MITI would have invoked its powers provided for in the Export
Trade Control Order under the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law in order to unilaterally control television sales for export to
the United States and carry out its established trade policy.
Therefore, when MITI decided the above-mentioned policy with re-
spect to such sales and directed the television manufacturers and export-
ers to conclude, under the Export and Import Trade Law, such agreement
and regulation relating to the minimum prices at which televisions could
be sold for the United States market and other matters, the Japanese
television manufacturers and exporters had no alternative but to estab-
lish the agreement and regulation in compliance with the said direction.
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Appendix B
May 7, 1981
Dear Mr. Attorney General:
I have the honor to inform you that the Government of Japan,
through explanations by the United States Government fully understands
the difficult situation of the U.S. auto industry.
Based upon the above understanding, the Government of Japan will
unilaterally restrain the volume of cars to be exported from Japan to the
U.S., according to the scheme explained hereinafter, in order to cooperate
with efforts to be taken for the recovery of the automobile industry in the
U.S.
The Government of Japan considers the orderly export of Japanese
products to be one of its basic trade policies so as not to create disruption
in the national economies of other countries. On May 1, 1981, the Cabinet
members concerned met, considered the attached scheme, and approved
it.
It is the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) that
has authority and responsibility for administering concretely Japan's ba-
sic trade policies.
The above-mentioned measures concerning Japanese car exports to
the U.S. will be put into practice through written directives setting the
maximum number of exportable units of passenger cars to the U.S. for
each Japanese automobile company, to be given by MITI in accordance
with its authority for bringing into action trade policies set forth in Arti-
cle Three (3) of the establishment law of MITI, as well as Article Forty-
eight (48) of The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law (Law
No. 228 of 1949).
Adherence to these directives will be secured by reports on car ex-
ports to the U.S. which are to be collected separately from each company
under the competent authority and responsibility of MITI.
Further, if any firm should fail to make a report or should make a
false report in violation of the provisions of Article Sixty-seven (67) of the
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, that firm will be pro-
ceeded against for punishment under Articles Seventy-two (72) and Sev-
enty-three (73) of the Law.
If on the basis of the above reports it becomes clear that any com-
pany threatens to exceed the limits set forth by MITI, the Government of
Japan will promptly make car exports to the U.S. subject to export licens-
ing, by amending the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet Order No.
378 of 1949) in accordance with Article Forty-eight (48) of the Foreign
Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law. MITI would then enforce the
export maximums it had established for each company by refusing to li-
cense exports in excess of those maximums. The Government of Japan
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has the authority under Japanese law to impose this requirement. It
would be a violation of Japanese law to export cars without an export
license in that situation, and any company engaging in such violation
would be proceeded against for imposition of fines, penalties or other
sanctions as provided by Article Seventy (70) of the Foreign Exchange
and Foreign Trade Control Law.
As the above-mentioned directives setting limits for exportable cars
and collecting reports from each company come as a result of the admin-
istrative authority inherent in the Government of Japan in accordance
with the laws of Japan, each company must obey the orders of the Gov-
ernment of Japan.
The Government of Japan considers that implementation of such an
export restraint by the Government of Japan, including the division of
the maximum number of exportable units among the companies by MITI,
and compliance with the restraints by Japanese automobile companies,
would not give rise to violations of American antitrust laws. However, the
Government of Japan requests that the Department of Justice, as the au-
thority chiefly responsible for administering the U.S. laws, support the
views of the Government of Japan.
Further, as to the export of passenger cars to Puerto Rico and the
export of automobiles which are classified under "commercial vehicles" in
JAMA statistics, but classified under "passenger cars" in the U.S., to the
U.S. and Puerto Rico, we would like to know that the views of the De-
partment of Justice are the same regarding the above should the Govern-













2520 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008
Dear Mr. Ambassador:
This letter is in response to the request of the Government of Japan,
set forth in its letter of May 7, and the two enclosures thereto, for the
views of the Department of Justice on antitrust questions regarding mea-
sures now being considered by the Government of Japan to unilaterally
restrain the export of passenger cars to the U.S. so as to cooperate with
the U.S. Government's domestic automobile industry recovery program.
The Government of Japan has advised us that the Ministry of Inter-
national Trade and Industry (MITI), which it represents has legal au-
thority and responsibility in the Government of Japan for carrying out
basic trade policy, including authority to take the measures described in
your letter and its two enclosures, and has authority to maintain orderly
exports, will establish at its discretion the maximum number of passenger
cars which may be exported to the U.S. by individual Japanese compa-
nies. MITI will issue a written directive to each company stating the max-
imum number of cars that company may export to the U.S. in a specified
period.
Further, MITI will direct individual companies to submit accurate
monthly reports on passenger car exports to the U.S. so as to assure the
implementation of the export limitation directive. It is understood, and
the directive will state that, in any case in which it becomes clear that
any company threatens to exceed the limits set forth by MITI, the Gov-
ernment of Japan will promptly make the export of cars to the U.S. sub-
ject to export licensing, in accordance with Article Forty-eight (48) of the
Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Law, (Law No. 228 of
1949), and Article One (1) of the Export Trade Control Order (Cabinet
Order No. 378 of 1949 as amended), by amending the Export Trade Con-
trol Order. MITI will then enforce the export maximums it established
for each company by refusing to license exports in excess of those maxi-
mums. The Government of Japan has advised us that MITI has the au-
thority to impose this requirement, that it would be a violation of Japa-
nese law to export cars without an export license in that situation, and
that such violation would be punished pursuant to Japanese law by fines,
penalties or other sanctions.
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In these circumstances, we believe that the Japanese automobile
companies' compliance with export limitations directed by MITI would
properly be viewed as having been compelled by the Japanese govern-
ment, acting within its sovereign powers. The Department of Justice is of
the view that implementation of such an export restraint by the Govern-
ment of Japan, including the division among the companies by MITI of
the maximum exportable number of units, and compliance with the pro-
gram by Japanese automobile companies, would not give rise to violations
of United States antitrust laws. We believe that American courts inter-
preting the antitrust laws in such a situation would likely so hold.
Further, in response to your inquiry regarding exports of passenger
cars to Puerto Rico and the exports of automobiles which are classified
under "commercial vehicles" in JAMA statistics but classified under
"passenger cars" in the U.S., we would like to state that if export limita-
tions are achieved through the same measures and authorities previously
described, the sovereign compulsion defense to any antitrust action that
might be brought under United States laws would be equally available.
Sincerely,
William French Smith
Attorney General
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